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Abstract
Empirical research suggests that lower interest rates induce banks to take higher risks. 
We assess analytically what this risk-taking channel implies for optimal monetary policy 
in a tractable New Keynesian model. We show that this channel creates a motive for 
the planner to stabilize the real rate. This objective confl icts with the standard infl ation 
stabilization objective. Optimal policy thus tolerates more infl ation volatility. An inertial 
Taylor-type reaction function becomes optimal. We then quantify the signifi cance of 
the risk-taking channel for monetary policy in an estimated medium-scale extension of the 
model. Ignoring the channel when designing policy entails non-negligible welfare costs 
(0.7% lifetime consumption equivalent).
Keywords: risk-taking channel, optimal monetary policy, inertial policy rate.
JEL classifi cation: E44, E52.
Resumen
La investigación empírica sugiere que los tipos de interés más bajos inducen a los 
bancos a asumir mayores riesgos. Analizamos lo que este canal de toma de riesgos 
implica para la política monetaria óptima en un modelo neokeynesiano manejable. 
Mostramos que este canal crea un motivo para que el planifi cador estabilice el tipo real. 
Este objetivo entra en confl icto con el objetivo estándar de estabilización de la infl ación. 
Por tanto, la política óptima tolera una mayor volatilidad de la infl ación. Una función de 
reacción inercial de tipo Taylor deviene óptima. También cuantifi camos la importancia 
del canal de toma de riesgos para la política monetaria en una extensión estimada de 
mediana escala del modelo. Ignorar el canal a la hora de diseñar la política monetaria 
conlleva unos costes de bienestar no despreciables (equivalentes al 0,7 % del consumo 
de por vida).
Palabras clave: canal de toma de riesgos, política monetaria óptima, tipo de política 
monetaria inercial.
Códigos JEL: E44, E52.
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1E.g. Maddaloni and Peydro (2011), Buch et al. (2014), Ioannidou et al. (2014), Jimenez et al.
(2014), Heider et al. (2019), Bubeck et al. (2020).
2For example, ECB board member Mersch (2020) remarked that “monetary accommodation
incentivizes financial firms to increase risk taking”, while FOMC meeting participants discussed
the possibility of “adjusting the stance of monetary policy to mitigate financial stability risks”,
particularly when macroprudential tools were likely to be ineffective (FOMC, 2020).
1 Introduction
The risk-taking channel of monetary policy – the mechanism by which lower interest
rates encourage banks to take on additional risk – is a well-established empirical
regularity. Studies have shown that this channel was active both before and after the
2008 financial crisis.1 Despite policymakers’ awareness of the risk-taking channel,
its normative implications for monetary policy remain to be determined.2 Should
central banks consider their influence on bank risk taking when setting their policy
rates, and if so, how?
We explore these questions in two steps. First, we embed a tractable model of bank
risk taking into the textbook New Keynesian model (NKM), and analytically char-
acterize optimal monetary policy under a linear-quadratic approximation. Second,
we embed the same model of the risk-taking channel into a larger New Keynesian
DSGE model estimated using US data, and we use it to explore the quantitative
importance of the risk-taking channel for optimal monetary policy. We show ana-
lytically that the risk-taking channel provides an incentive for the central bank to
minimize the volatility of the real interest rate, conflicting with the standard New
Keynesian policy prescription to minimize inflation volatility. Hence, the risk-taking
channel introduces a new trade-off for the policy maker. We find this new trade-off
to be quantitatively significant in the large model: Ignoring the risk-taking channel
when designing optimal monetary policy entails welfare costs of approximately 0.7%
of lifetime consumption equivalent.
To derive the analytical conclusions, we set up a simple New Keynesian model
with financial intermediation and a bank risk-taking channel. Firms must borrow in
advance to finance production, as in Ravenna and Walsh (2006). Firms’ technologies
are risky and differ in their risk-return characteristics. Banks provide the necessary
external financing to firms by funding themselves through equity and deposits, and
they choose the riskiness of the firm in which they invest. As in Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2014), frictions in the banking system – limited liability, the unobservability of risk
taking, and an equity premium – cause a risk shifting problem. Banks choose to
lend to excessively risky firms, in the sense that a reduction in risk would increase
the expected social return on their investment. The level of the real interest rate
influences the degree of banks’ risk taking: Lower real interest rates induce banks
to choose even riskier investments, thus giving rise to the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy.
Since risk taking comes at the cost of lower expected return on investment, the
central bank might wish to reduce risk taking by increasing the average level of real
interest rates. However, due to long-run neutrality of monetary policy, the central
bank cannot control the long run level of the real interest rate. Nevertheless, this
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does not render the risk-taking channel irrelevant for monetary policy. As we show
analytically, the average efficiency of banks’ investments decreases not only in the
level, but also in the volatility of the real interest rate. The latter can be controlled
by the central bank. Thus the risk-taking channel translates into an motive for the
central bank to stabilize the real interest rate around its policy-independent average
level.
The model remains highly tractable and, in linearized form, boils down to a modifi-
cation of the textbook three-equation NKM, which allows us to characterize optimal
monetary policy analytically using a linear quadratic approximation and to derive
the impact of the risk-taking channel on optimal policy. We derive four key results.
First, we show that welfare depends not only on output gap and inflation volatility,
as in the standard NKM, but also on the volatility of the real interest rate. Second,
we find that the presence of the risk-taking channel decreases the optimal response
to inflation in the central bank’s Taylor rule. Third, we find that the inclusion of
the risk-taking channel implies less real interest rate volatility, but greater infla-
tion volatility under optimal policy.These last two results hold true regardless of
whether we consider optimal policy under discretion or optimal simple rules under
commitment. Fourth, we derive an implicit instrument rule that implements fully
Ramsey-optimal policy under commitment, and find that the risk-taking channel
requires inertia in the policy rate. The risk-taking channel thus provides a novel
explanation for interest rate inertia, which is routinely built into Taylor rules in
models and typically observed empirically.
Having explored the risk-taking channel analytically in a stylized model, we then
turn to the question of whether this channel is also quantitatively relevant for op-
timal monetary policy. To address this question, we use the medium scale DSGE
model of Abbate and Thaler (2019). This model combines the same banking-sector
model described above with an otherwise standard medium scale New-Keynesian
model à la Smets and Wouters (2007). This model provides a reasonable descrip-
tion of macro-dynamics and is thus a better laboratory for quantitative analysis. In
fact, Abbate and Thaler (2019) estimate the model using US data and show that
the inclusion of the risk-taking channel improves the fit of the model for macroeco-
nomic time series, generates a path of risk taking that matches survey evidence on
the riskiness of newly issued loans, and gives rise to procyclical bank leverage, as
documented by Adrian and Shin (2014).
We employ this model to numerically determine optimal policy under simple rules.
We derive four results that confirm and quantify the four theoretical results men-
tioned above. First, the central bank accepts approximately 50% more inflation
volatility than in the absence of the risk-taking channel. Second, the optimal Taylor
rule features a significantly lower response to inflation and, third, an autoregres-
sive coefficient of approximately 1 when the risk-taking channel is active. Fourth
and most importantly, the welfare costs of considering the risk-taking channel when
designing optimal monetary policy are significant, and amount to around 0.7% of
lifetime consumption equivalent. The risk-taking channel thus has the potential
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to affect optimal policy significantly. This contrasts findings in the literature that
other types of financial frictions do not affect optimal monetary policy significantly
(e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 2001 or De Fiore and Tristani, 2013).
Our model builds on an extensive literature documenting the risk-taking channel
empirically, including Maddaloni and Peydro (2011), Buch et al. (2014), Ioannidou
et al. (2014), Jimenez et al. (2014), Bubeck et al. (2020) and Heider et al. (2019).
They all find that low rates increase the riskiness of banks’ new investments. The
second and third paper add an important qualification to the risk-taking channel by
showing that banks do not offset higher risk with a sufficiently large increase in the
risk premium. Risk taking is thus inefficient, as in our model.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we contribute to the theoretical
macro literature on the risk-taking channel. This literature has so far taken a largely
positive approach and described different versions of the risk-taking channel. Many
models focus on the risks generated by the banks’ leverage choice on the liabilities
side of their balance sheets. Some link greater leverage to a stronger financial
accelerator (e.g. Gertler et al., 2012 and de Groot, 2014), while others link it to a
larger incidence of bank runs (Angeloni and Faia, 2013 and Angeloni et al., 2015).
Closer to the empirical literature cited above, other authors focus on the riskiness of
banks’ investments, that is, on risk taking on the asset side of their balance sheets.
Christensen et al. (2011) and Collard et al. (2017) are two examples, but in their
models market discipline or regulation always ensures that risk taking is efficient
in equilibrium, so there is no important role for monetary policy. In contrast, our
companion paper Abbate and Thaler (2019) and Afanasyeva and Guentner (2020)
explore the interactions of monetary policy and banks’ asset risk taking in a medium
scale DSGE model from a positive point of view.
The first contribution of this paper is therefore to add normative conclusions for
monetary policy to this largely positive literature.3 In doing so, our paper is related
to Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2019), who provide a simple two period macro-
model in which banks’ asset risk taking is modeled and affected by monetary policy
in a very similar way. Since risk taking is excessive from a social point of view,
the authors argue that this mechanism constitutes a motive for the central bank
to increase the real interest rate through monetary policy. Because we consider
monetary policy in the long run under rational expectations, our message contrasts
with theirs. We argue that monetary policy cannot systematically raise the real
interest rate due to monetary neutrality, which is a central tenet of New Keynesian
theory. However, monetary policy can still affect risk taking by influencing the
volatility of the real interest rate.4
3Of course, the risk-taking channel also has important normative implications for regulatory
policy, from which we abstract for simplicity. We view this choice as a shortcut to model the
arguably realistic fact that regulation might not be 100% effective at muting the risk-taking channel
in practice – otherwise the channel should not be in the data.
4We conjecture that our intuition might also apply to Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2019) in
the long run. Since the welfare function is concave in the real rate, a mean preserving increase in
the volatility of the real rate is detrimental to average welfare.
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5Note that while in our case it is the real interest rate, not the nominal one, that appears in
the welfare function, the effects are similar.
The second contribution is to the normative literature on interest rate inertia. While
the inertial nature of policy rates is well documented empirically and inertial Taylor
rules are standard in monetary models, it is theoretically not straightforward that
such inertia is optimal from a planner’s point of view. By showing that the risk-
taking channel adds an interest rate variation term to the welfare function and leads
to interest rate inertia under Ramsey policy, we provide a novel theory that can
explain inertial interest rate policy. In doing so, we complement other explanations
for why interest rate volatility matters for welfare, such as the zero lower bound or
transactions frictions in Woodford (2003).5
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2 we set up a simple NKM with the risk-
2 A simple New Keynesian model of the bank risk-
taking channel
In this section, we set up a simple New Keynesian model with financial interme-
diation and a bank risk-taking channel. We build on Ravenna and Walsh’s (2006)
model of the cost channel, where firms need to borrow in advance to finance produc-
tion. While we are not interested in the cost channel per se, it represents a tractable
and parsimonious way to introduce intermediation into the textbook three-equation
New Keynesian model without introducing capital.6 We extend this basic model of
intermediation to introduce the risk-taking channel as in Abbate and Thaler (2019),
who build on Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014). Firm’s production technology is risky and
banks, who finance firms, can choose the riskiness of the firm they lend to.
The simplicity of the model has two advantages: First, we can cleanly demonstrate
how bank risk taking alters the otherwise standard set of equations of a basic New
Keynesian model. Second, we can derive an analytical approximation of the social
welfare function, as well as optimal monetary policy rules. Finally, while simple,
the model replicates two key stylised facts about the asset risk-taking channel es-
tablished in the empirical literature. First, that lower interest rates induce banks
to make riskier loans (e.g. Jimenez et al., 2014). Second, that the increase in risk
exposure is not offset by an increase in risk premia (Buch et al., 2014 and Ioannidou
et al., 2014), i.e. that this additional risk is inefficient.
The model economy has eight types of agents: Households, input good produc-
ers, intermediate goods producers, final good producers, equity and deposit funds,
private banks, and the central bank. We discuss these agents in turn.
6Introducing capital makes the optimal policy problem analytically intractable. In the numerical
analysis in section 4 we introduce intermediation through capital rather than the cost channel.
taking channel, which we then use in section 3 to explore optimal policy analytically.
In section 4 we briefly discuss the medium scale model, which we then use to analyze
the quantitative importance for optimal policy numerically. Section 5 concludes.
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2.1 Households
Households choose consumption Ct, working hours Nt, cash holdings Mt and shares












Timing is as follows: Households enter period t with nominal money holdings Mt−1.
They then receive wage income WtNt in cash as well as a lump-sum cash injection
Xt from the central bank. They then use this cash to investment into equity and
deposit funds Dt and Et, and to purchase the consumption good Ct, which has to
be paid in advance. Hence, consumption is subject to the following cash-in-advance
(CIA) constraint:
PtCt ≤ Mt−1 + WtNt − Dt − Et + Xt (1)
At the end of the period, households work and consume the previously chosen quan-
tities Nt and Ct. Furthermore, the household receives payments from the equity
and deposit funds remunerated at the safe nominal (gross) rate Ret and Rdt , as well
as any profit income Πt from firms and the two funds. Hence, cash holdings Mt at
the end of the period are:
Mt = Mt−1 + WtNt − Dt − Et − PtCt + Rdt Dt + Ret Et +Πt + Xt (2)
Utility maximization implies that the two safe interest rates are the same, so that
we can simply refer to the safe rate as Rt:
Ret = Rdt ≡ Rt (3)















Furthermore, the CIA constraint (1) must hold with equality in any equilibrium
with positive nominal rates.
2.2 Input good producers
There exists a continuum of ex-ante identical input good producers indexed by
m, who hire labor Nm to produce the input good zmt using a risky production
technology, which has constant returns to scale (CRS) with respect to labor. Each
input producer has access to a continuum of technologies with different risk-return
characteristics indexed by qm ∈ [0, 1]. Given a certain technology qmt , the output of
producer m is:
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7Alternatively, one can assume that qm is a fixed characteristic of a producer, but that there




ω1 − ω22 qmt
)
Nmt with probablity qmt
0 else
Input producers need to pre-pay the wage bill WtNmt at the beginning of the period,
but only produce at the end of the period. They therefore need to borrow from
the bank in order to finance the wage bill. They promise to repay the loan after
production at the gross nominal loan rate rl,t and let the bank choose the riskiness of
their technology qt.7 If the production process is successful, producers sell the input
good at price Pin,t and repay the loan. If the production process is not successful,
the producers default.
Input producers choose the scale of production that maximises their profits. Price
taking and the linearity of the production technology in Nt imply that they pass on
all their revenues to the bank and make zero profits. Hence, the nominal price of
the input good is equal to:
Pin,t = rl,tWt/
(





Assuming that the producers’ success events are independent, and given that in
equilibrium all producers use the same technology qt, the quantity of input goods
produced in equilibrium is given by:
Zt = qt
(











mdm, and where f(qt) denotes the expected
productivity of input good producers.
2.3 Final and intermediate good producers
Final and intermediate good producers are standard and hence discussed only briefly.
A representative final good producer aggregates intermediate good varieties Y i to









There is a continuum of intermediate good producers indexed by i who produce
differentiated intermediate goods under monopolistic competition and Calvo pric-
ing. Their CRS technology is given by Y i = AtZit , i.e. they linearly transform
input goods into intermediate varieties, where At is total factor productivity. They
purchase input goods at price Pin,t and receive a proportional subsidy τt on their
purchases. This subsidy is financed by lump sum taxes on the household and plays a
similar role as the labor subsidy often used in the textbook NKM. Hence, their nom-
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8The cost channel only serves as a convenient device to introduce intermediation into the 3-
equation NKM without capital. The implications of the cost channel for optimal policy are discussed
in detail in Ravenna and Walsh (2006). In the medium scale model which we explore numerically
inal marginal cost is given by MCt =
Pin,t(1−τt)
At






ω1 − ω22 qmt
)
Note that the above marginal cost definition differs from the standard one in the
basic New Keynesian model (e.g. Galí, 2015) in two ways. First, due to the presence
of different risky production technologies: Input good production is risky at firm
level, but one unit of labor is transformed into f(qt) = qt
(
ω1 − ω22 qmt
)
units of input
goods on average across all input goods producers. The higher the productivity
of inputs good producers f(qt), the lower the marginal costs of intermediate firms.
Second, due to the presence of the cost-channel as in Ravenna and Walsh (2006):
Since input producers have to pre-finance their wage bill, their marginal costs are
given by the wage bill multiplied by expected gross interest payments on the wage
bill qtrl,t. Since we are not interested in the cost channel per se, we assume that the
government sets the subsidy τt such that the cost channel is muted τt = 1 − 1qtrl,t .8
in the last section, we do not need to rely on the cost channel since the presence of capital allows
to introduce intermediation in a more straightforward way.
9We will not impose this subsidy in the large model in section 4, and we have verified numerically
that it would not affect the results reported there significantly.
This subsidy is not relevant for the derivation of the welfare function in section
3.1, but it simplifies the Phillips curve and, as a result, the derivation of optimal





ω1 − ω22 qmt
) (8)
Marginal costs now differ from the standard definition only due to the risk-taking
channel. We will discuss the implication of this difference later.
Calvo price-setting is standard. Every period, each intermediate good producer can
reset its price P it with probability 1 − ω. The price is set to maximize expected
discounted profits, using the households stochastic discount factor and taking the
demand function for their variety as given. This leads to the standard dynamics of
aggregate prices and price dispersion reported in Appendix A.
2.4 Equity and deposit funds
As we explain in the next subsection, there is a continuum of banks indexed by
b which fund loans through deposits Dbt and equity Ebt at the beginning of the
period. Each bank is subject to a binary idiosyncratic shock, which makes a bank
fail with probability 1 − qt. If the bank fails, both equity holders and depositors
loose their investment. If the bank does not fail, bank deposits and equity pay the
gross nominal deposit and equity rates rbd and rbe at the end of the period. The
deposit and equity funds hold the deposits and equity of all banks, thus diversifying
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10Equivalently, we could assume that the household perfectly diversifies its deposits and equity
across banks, or that there is perfect risk sharing among a continuum of households, each interacting
with one bank.
11This equity premium can be explained by a simple agency problem. Assume the equity fund’s
manager faces two possibilities. Either he behaves diligently, investing funds Et into banks at the
beginning of the period, paying back the return of this investment at the end of the period. Or he
absconds with the cash at the beginning of the period, consuming a fraction ξ in the next period,
while the rest is lost. To prevent the latter, equity providers promise to pay him a premium pt at
the end of the period, conditional on not absconding. The minimal premium that induces diligent
behavior is pt = ξtEtπt+1.
12This simple way of modeling the equity premium, which can be reinterpreted as transaction
costs of equity or a convenience yield of deposits is common, e.g. Allen et al. (2011) or Hellmann
et al. (2000). Gorton and Winton (2017) provides a microfoundation where the equity premium
arises from a liquidity motive.
away any idiosyncratic risk. They are financed by fund shares purchased by the








t db. Note that the funds merely
serve as modeling devices to simplify the exposition.10
The deposit fund is a frictionless pass-on vehicle. It invests its funds into all banks,
represents the depositors’ interests perfectly and returns the nominal deposit fund
rate Rd,t, which is simply the average return on deposits:
Rd,t = qtrd,t . (9)
As a simple way to introduce an equity premium, we assume the equity fund manager
is paid a (real) premium ξ per unit of funds under management to incentivize him
to act in the best interest of equity providers. This premium is rebated to the
household in a lump-sum fashion as part of his profit income.11 The nominal return
on the equity fund is hence given by the average return on bank equity minus the
premium:
Re,t = qtre,t − ξEtπt+1 . (10)
Since both funds are perfectly diversified, the returns of both funds are risk free.
Hence, the households’ FOCs imply that the return on fund shares are equated
Re,t = Rd,t ≡ Rt. Nevertheless, the costs of deposit and equity financing for banks
differ from each other due to the equity premium ξ. To see this, combine this








The equity premium invalidates the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance principle and, as
we will see, plays an important role in delivering the risk-taking channel.12
2.5 Banks
Banks finance themselves through deposits and equity, and invest these funds into
risky assets. In particular, banks choose the scale of their balance sheet, their capital
structure and the riskiness of their assets, taking interest rates as given. We show in
this section that the bank risk choice has implications for the allocative efficiency of
the economy, and therefore bears implications for monetary policy. The modeling
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13The choice of qt may be interpreted both as lending to borrowers of different risk levels, or as
monitoring same borrower so as to make repayment more likely. Also see FN 7.
of the banks follows Abbate and Thaler (2019), who build on Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2014), and involves three key assumptions: (i) Unobservability of the bank’s risk
choice and (ii) limited liability of the bank, which give rise to an agency problem
between depositors and equity providers, and (iii) the cost advantage of deposits
over equity introduced in the previous subsection.
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical competitive banks (for convenience we omit
the bank’s index b in this subsection). Banks live for one period. At the beginning
of the period, each bank chooses how much deposits Dt and equity Et to raise
from the respective funds, and lends these resources to one particular input good
producer at a promised (gross) rate rl,t. When lending to an input producer, the
bank chooses the risk characteristic qt of the technology employed by the producer.13
While the bank selects the level of risk, depositors cannot observe this risk choice.
Hence deposit contracts cannot be made contingent upon the bank’s risk choice,
and the bank cannot credibly commit to a certain risk choice either. At the end
of the period, the bank’s loan is due. Since each bank invests into only one input
producer, the return on the bank’s assets is risky. If the input good producer is
successful, which happens with probability qt, the bank receives rl,t(Et + Dt). In
that case, the bank repays its deposits and equity at the promised nominal (gross)
rates rd,t and re,t. With probability 1 − qt, the production fails, and the loan is
worthless. In this case, limited liability protects equity providers from depositors’
claims such that both depositors and equity providers receive nothing.
It is convenient to understand the bank’s problem as a two-stage problem. At stage
1, the bank chooses the scale of its balance sheet and the capital structure. At stage
2, once the balance sheet has been determined and the deposit rate has been fixed,
the bank chooses the risk level qt. At each stage, the bank maximizes the expected
value of its profits net of the user cost of equity – excess profits for short. The bank’s
objective function in nominal terms is hence given by:
qt
{






When choosing the riskiness of its investment qt, the bank understands the risk
return trade-off implied by the capital producers’ optimality condition (6). We can
hence substitute rl,t in the above expression. Furthermore, define the equity ratio as
kt ≡ EtEt+Dt and the total balance sheet size by ot ≡ Dt + Et and divide everything
















To simplify notation, we rewrite the objective function in real variables using the fol-







, rrd,t = Et [rd,t/πt+1] , rre,t = Et [re,t/πt+1] , Rrt =
Et [Rt/πt+1] . The objective function can be reexpressed as:
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{(




r̃rl,t − qtrrd,t(1 − kt) − qtrre,tkt
}
ot .
Now we solve the bank’s problem recursively.
At the second stage, the bank has already raised Et + Dt funds and now needs
to choose the riskiness of its investment qt. As already mentioned, we assume that
the bank cannot write contracts conditional on qt with the depositors at stage one.
Therefore, at the second stage the bank takes the deposit rate as given. Further-
more, since the capital structure is already determined, maximizing equity holders’
expected profits in excess of the cost of equity coincides with maximizing the ex-








r̃rl,t − qtrrd,t(1 − kt) .
The FOC reads:
qt =
ω1r̃rl,t − rrd,t (1 − kt)
ω2r̃rl,t
.
At the first stage, the bank chooses the capital structure kt and the balance sheet
size ot to maximize expected excess profits, subject to the participation constraints
(i.e. the funding supply schedules) for depositors and equity providers. Since agents
have rational expectations, everyone correctly infers the level of risk qt that will be
chosen by the bank at the second stage as a function of kt, rrd,t and r̃rl,t. The first






















ω1r̃rl,t − rrd,t (1 − kt)
ω2r̃rl,t
.

















ω21 − (4ω2(1 − kt)Rrt ) /r̃rl,t
ω2
.
The FOCs for leverage kt reads:
kt = 1 −
ξ(Rrt + ξ)ω21 r̃rl,t
ω2Rrt (Rrt + 2ξ2)
.
Finally, since the first stage problem is linear in the balance sheet size ot, the corre-
sponding first order condition requires banks to make no expected profits in excess
of the costs of funds:
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14The financial sector is said to be in equilibrium when banks and input goods producers solve










− (ktξ + Rrt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of funds
= 0 . (11)
We can combine the last three equations to derive the banks’ risk choice qt as a
function of the safe real interest rate:
qt =
ω1(ξ + Rrt )
ω2(2ξ + Rrt )
. (12)
2.5.1 Bank risk taking in equilibrium
Equation (12) describes the representative bank’s risk choice when the financial
sector is in equilibrium.14 The equilibrium risk choice thus depends on only one
endogenous variable: The real interest rate Rrt . It has four important properties:
PROPOSITION 1: Let qt denote the optimal risk choice of the bank in equi-
librium for a given level of the expected real rate Rrt and assume this choice is
interior. Recall the definition of the expected productivity of the input producer
f(qt) ≡
(
ω1 − ω22 qt
)
qt. Then:
(1) Risk decreases in the real interest rate: ∂qt∂Rrt > 0 .
(2) Risk taking is excessive: qt < argmax f(qt) .
(3) Expected productivity increases in the real interest rate: ∂f(qt)∂Rrt > 0 .
(4) Expected productivity is a concave function of the real interest rate
∂2f(qt)
∂(Rrt )
2 < 0 .
Part 1 of the proposition, which can be easily derived from equation (12), states that
a decline in the real risk-free rate Rrt induces banks to invest into riskier projects
(qt falls). This is the risk-taking channel at work.
What is the intuition behind it? By choosing its funding structure at stage 1 the
bank implicitly determines its risk choice at stage 2, which is understood and priced
in by depositors. Thus, when the bank chooses its leverage, it balances the advan-
tages of deposits (lower costs due to the excess equity premium) with those of equity
(mores skin in the game, hence less risk taking at stage 2, thus higher expected re-
turn on investment). A reduction in the safe real rate makes the equity premium
a more important component of the cost of equity, in relative terms. Thus banks
have a stronger incentive to rely on cheaper deposits and thus to lever up. This
reduces their skin-in-the-game and induces them to take more risk. For this result
it is crucial that the equity premium is constant in absolute terms. As Abbate and
Thaler (2019) argue, this assumption is both common in the theoretical literature
as well as empirically plausible.
( )
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Part 2 states that the bank’s risk choice is excessive (i.e. suboptimally high), in
the sense that expected productivity would increase if the bank chose a safer invest-
ment. The inefficiency of the risk choice results from the agency problem between
depositors and equity providers and the fact that deposits are cheaper than equity.
In the absence of these frictions, qt would be chosen to maximize expected produc-
tivity (ω1 − ω22 qt)qt and would thus be given by qo = ω1ω2 . The frictions drive a wedge





15Even more generally, for the analytical results about optimal policy in section 3 the exact
mechanism behind the risk-taking channel is irrelevant. All that will matter is the concavity of
f (qt (Rrt )).
Figure 1: Expected return on bank assets f(qt) = f (qt (Rrt )), as a function of the




This wedge is smaller than one, i.e. banks choose excessive risk. Furthermore, it
increases in Rrt . Thus, risk taking gets more excessive as the real rate falls, implying
a lower expected productivity f (qt) as stated in part 3.
Finally, part 4 states that the effect of Rrt on expected productivity f (qt) decreases in
Rrt . That is f (qt (Rrt )) is a concave function. This result will be crucial for optimal
policy. Parts 2 to 4 of proposition 1 are illustrated in figure 1. Notice that the
exact shape of the risk return trade-off does not need to be quadratic as we assumed
for f(qt): as Abbate and Thaler (2019) show, proposition 1 generally holds for any
increasing concave function f(qt). Concavity in turn is a natural assumption since
it guarantees an interior solution.15
2.6 Central bank
To close the model, the central bank needs to set the nominal interest rate according
to some criterion and adjust the money supply accordingly. It may follow a Taylor
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rule or optimize welfare. We leave this criterion unspecified for now. This concludes
the description of the model.
2.7 Comparison to the three-equation New Keynesian model
Our model embeds the risk-taking channel into the basic textbook NKM. Frictions
in the banking sector imply that lower interest rates lead banks to choose riskier
investments with a lower expected productivity. This alters two key equations in
the standard New Keynesian model: The definitions of aggregate output and of
marginal costs. We discuss them in turn. The other equations remain unaltered,
and we report them in Appendix A.
First, using equation (7) and aggregating the intermediate goods, aggregate output












where Δt is the standard price dispersion term. This expression implies that, because
of the risk-taking channel, aggregate output is not only a function of labor, total
factor productivity and price dispersion, but also of the average productivity of the
input production technology f(qt). This new term is a function of the real interest
rate by equation (12):














The risk-taking channel has both steady-state and dynamic implications for aggre-
gate output. From part 2 of Proposition 1, we know that the banking sector frictions
lead to excessive (suboptimally high) risk taking, both in and outside the steady
state, so that f(qt) < f(qo), where f(qo) is the productivity of input good produc-
ers evaluated at the optimal risk level. The inefficient risk choice translates to an
inefficiently low level of aggregate output, both in and outside the steady state.
Moreover, risk taking gets more excessive as the real interest rate falls (part 3 in
Proposition 1). This implies that the lower the real interest rate, the lower the level
of aggregate output.
Second, marginal costs are also affected by the risk-taking channel. They are given











As noted before, this equation differs from that of a standard New Keynesian model
in the term f(qt). Productivity depends not only on total factor productivity, but
also on the risk level chosen by the banks. By the same arguments discussed for
output, marginal costs are hence excessively high and decrease in the real interest
rate.
After linearization, the model condenses to the two well-known equations, that
together with a policy rule for the nominal interest rate define the three-equation
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NKM : the IS curve and the Phillips curve. While the former is the same as in
the textbook model, the risk-taking channel shows up in the Phillips curve (see
Appendix B2) via the marginal costs:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ (σ + ϕ) x̂t − κ (1 + ϕ)R1R̂rt + ut (15)
Here κ = (1−ω)(1−βω)ω is the coefficient on marginal costs in the standard New Key-
nesian Phillips curve, x̂t is the log of the welfare relevant output gap (wrt. to the
efficient level) and R̂rt is the expected real rate, the latter two in deviation from
the steady state, R1 is a positive coefficient defined in the next section, and ut is a
cost-push shock driven by θt.
To summarize, once the model is condensed, the risk-taking channel shows up as a
function f (Rrt ) multiplying TFP. Our model is hence isomorphic to a model where
TFP is a positive, concave function of the real interest rate. Next, we explore how
this channel alters the standard trade off faced by the monetary policy authority.
3 Optimal monetary policy in the simple model
To understand the impact of the risk-taking channel on optimal policy, we first
derive a second order approximation of the planner’s welfare function, and then use
it to derive optimal policy.
3.1 The objective function
We assume the planner maximizes household utility. As we show in Appendix B1,
in case of a small steady-state markup, a second-order approximation to consumer
welfare leads to the following social loss function:
















(1 + ϕ)R21 + R2
) (
R̂rt
)2 −R1 (σ − 1) R̂rt ŷet + R1 (1 + ϕ) R̂rt x̂t
]}
where ŷet denotes the efficient level of output, x̂t the welfare relevant output gap, both
in log deviations from steady state, and where R̂rt denotes the period t expectation of
the real interest rate in next period, in deviations from steady state. The first three
terms in the loss function are the usual in the standard New Keynesian model and
imply that consumer welfare declines in (i) the steady-state output gap distortion,
(ii) fluctuations of inflation and (iii) fluctuations of the output gap. The term Θ
is the steady-state distortion related to imperfect competition in the intermediate
sector, which is defined as Θ = 1− 1Φ where Φ is the steady-state markup. The other
terms are related to the risk-taking channel and discussed in the Appendix. Here
we just note that the fourth term implies that welfare increases in the real interest
rate because the efficiency of risk taking increases in the real rate. The coefficients
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16The expressions for R1 and R2 are reported in Appendix B1. Note that these terms, which
measure the strength of the risk-taking channel, increase in the equity premium ξ.









where f(Rr) denotes the steady state of equation (14), and fR and fRR respectively
denote the first and second-order derivatives of f(Rr) with respect to Rr, which we
characterized in proposition 1.16
Because our main focus is on stabilization policies, we will follow the literature in
assuming that time-invariant subsidies are in place such that the steady state is
efficient. This eliminates the steady-state markup (Θ = 0) and the steady-state
inefficiency in risk taking, such that fR = 0, while still fRR < 0. Later we relax this
assumption, both in an analytical extension and in the numerical anlysis. The loss










(1 − βω) (1 − ω)θπ
2





This expression is identical to the welfare function in the textbook NKM, with the
exception of the last term. This is our first key result about optimal policy: The
risk-taking channel introduces a real interest rate volatility term into the second
order approximation of welfare. To understand why this term appears, recall part 4
of Proposition 1, which states that the expected return of the bank’s investment is
concave. This implies that a mean preserving spread in the real interest rate reduces
the expected return of investment by Jensen’s inequality. Volatility in the expected
real interest rate thus affects welfare negatively. This intuition is evident from (16):
The weight on real rate volatility in the loss function is R2 = − fRRf(Rr) . This weight
is positive due to the concavity of expected productivity in the real rate (fRR < 0).
Recall that the equity premium ξ was defined in real terms. This is important here.
If the equity premium were instead a nominal object, the nominal rate would appear
instead of the real in (16).
3.2 The central bank’s problem
Under the assumption of an undistorted steady state, the linear approximation of
the model reduces to the same IS and Phillips curves as in the textbook NKM. A
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subject to the IS equation:







πt = βEtπt+1 + κ (σ + ϕ)xt + ut (19)
17In a standard NKMwithout the risk-taking channel it is optimal for the central bank to stabilize
both inflation and the output gap x̂t perfectly in response to ’demand’ shocks such as temporary
productivity, government spending or preference shocks, which affect the flex-price economy as well
(divine coincidence Blanchard and Galí, 2007). Since such a zero-inflation-zero-output-gap policy
requires the real rate to follow the natural rate, it implies non-zero real rate volatility. The risk-
taking channel thus introduces a trade-off that breaks the divine coincidence and leads to the same
key results that we derive in the absence of such a shock and that we summarizein section 3.5.
Note that these key results do not include a statement about the output gap volatility, which would
increase in R2 if At were the only shock.
18This particular rule is useful to build intuition, since it directly relates the (expected) real rate
to inflation. Furthermore, such a rule results from optimal policy under discretion.
and the linearized definition of the real rate:
R̂rt = R̂t − Etπt+1 (20)
where λ = κθ (σ + ϕ) denotes the weight of output fluctuations relative to inflation
fluctuations in the loss function, θ is the elasticity of substitution between goods in
the steady state and xt is the output gap wrt. to the steady state. The supply-side
cost push shock ut is assumed to follow an AR process with autoregressive coefficient
ρ. For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we have also assumed that TFP At
is constant so that no shock appears in the IS curve.17
3.3 Optimal policy: Optimal simple rule
We now derive optimal monetary policy, starting with the case of a central bank
that commits to a simple rule of the shape R̂t = φsπEtπt+1, i.e. a forward-looking
Taylor rule.18 As we show in Appendix B3.1 the optimal simple rule is given by
R̂t = φsπEtπt+1 =
[
1 +
θκσ(1 − ρ)(σ + ϕ)
ρ(1 − βρ) (θλ + κ(1 − ρ)2R2σ2)
]
Etπt+1 (21)
The Taylor rule coefficient φsπ is larger than 1. Deriving φsπ with respect to the risk-
taking channel parameter R2 delivers our second result: The risk-taking channel
lowers the optimal response of the nominal interest rate to expected inflation, i.e:
∂φsπ
∂R2 < 0 (22)
The intuition is straightforward. A value of φsπ = 1 would imply a stable real interest
rate, thus a central bank that cares about stabilizing the real rate chooses a value
closer to 1.
To gain further intuition, we solve the model under this rule . That is, we find
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19The effect of the risk-taking channel on the volatility of the nominal rate is ambiguous: For
low enough values of ρ, the risk-taking channel also implies a lower volatility of the nominal rate.
policy functions of the form: xt = aut, πt = but, R̂t = cut and R̂rt+1 = dut. The
coefficients (a, b, c, d), derived and reported in Appendix B3.1, not only tell us the
response of the respective variables to cost push shocks under optimal policy. The
absolute values of these coefficients also determine the standard deviation of the
four variables of interest, up to a scaling factor which is the standard deviation of
the cost-push shock. To understand how these standard deviations change with
the risk-taking channel, we compute the rate of change of the four coefficients with
respect to the risk-taking channel parameter R2 and check the sign.
We thus arrive to our third main result: Optimal policy with the risk-taking channel
implies a lower volatility of the output gap and of the real interest rate, but a higher
volatility of inflation, relative to the model without the risk-taking channel.19
What is the intuition behind these results? The standard trade-off in the NKM with
cost push shocks is that, through the Phillips curve, inflation stabilization comes
at the cost of higher output gap volatility. However, through the IS curve, higher
output gap volatility also implies higher real interest rate volatility. This is irrelevant
in the standard NKM where the IS curve and the interest rates are recursive. But it
becomes costly once the risk-taking channel is active, since fluctuations in the real
rate lead to less efficient risk choices on average. The risk-taking channel thus tilts
the trade-off between output gap and inflation stabilization arising from cost-push
shocks in favor of the former. In other words, the risk-taking channel increases the
central bank’s tolerance to deviations of the real rate from the natural rate.
3.4 Optimal policy: Ramsey-optimal policy
Next, we turn to Ramsey-optimal policy. The central bank’s problem is to solve
(17) by choosing conditional paths for inflation, the output gap and the interest
rate. Appendix B3.2 provides the Lagrangian and the first-order conditions of this
Ramsey problem. As the presence of lagged multipliers in the first-order conditions
highlights, this Ramsey policy complicates the model, since it leads to the intro-
duction of state variables. For this reason, no analytical solution is available for
the rational expectations equilibrium defined by these conditions. However, it is
possible to combine the first-order conditions to derive an implicit instrument rule
as in Giannoni and Woodford (2003). This rule applies from t ≥ 2, is optimal from
a timeless perspective and reads:
R̂t = ρ1R̂t−1 + ρ2ΔR̂t−1 + φEπEtπt+1 + φππt + φπ−1πt−1 + φxΔxt
where ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 1β , φEπ = 1, φπ =
θσ+θϕ
R2σ − 1β − 1, φπ − 1 = 1β , φx = θλR22κσ .
Similarly as above, the weight on inflation in this Taylor-type rule decreases in the
strength of the risk-taking channel. Furthermore, this rule exhibits a nontrivial
degree of persistence: ρ1 = 1, ρ2 > 1. That is, the history dependence embedded
in Ramsey policy makes it optimal for the central bank to move the policy rate
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20Note that we are not claiming that Ramsey policy in the standard NKM features no history
dependence. However, in the standard NKM, ’optimal policy rules [...] are necessarily pure targeting
rules: that is, they involve a commitment to adjust interest rates as necessary to achieve a certain
target criterion, where the target criterion itself is independent of the path of the interest rate
instrument.’ (Woodford, 2003, p. 560). By contrast, the target criterion given by the above
instrument rule does depend on past interest rates,
21Note that the above rule does not nest a rule for the standard NKM. However, as the weight
on real rate stabilization κ
θ
R22 goes towards 0, past interest rates become less important in the
determination of the current interest rate, relative to deviations of output and inflation.
in an inertial manner. Intuitively, moving the policy rate less strongly but for an
extended period of time allows the planner to control demand – which depends on
all expected future rates – as well as if he moved the policy rate more strongly but
for a shorter period. But the latter would lead to higher real rate volatility, which
is costly due to the risk-taking channel. As Woodford (2003) shows, in the model
without the risk taking channel, that is in the simple NKM, the Ramsey-optimal
interest rate paths do not involve any explicit reference to the lagged interest rate.20
Thus, under Ramsey-optimal policy the risk-taking channel introduces a case for
persistent policy responses.21 This is our fourth analytical result.
The risk-taking channel thus provides an additional explanation for interest rate
inertia, which is routinely built into Taylor rules in models, and which is typically
observed in practice. It complements other theories such as the zero lower bound
or the cost of holding money, which regularly motivate researchers to include the
interest rate – the nominal one, not the real one as in our case – in the welfare
function and which also lead to inertia under optimal policy (Woodford, 2003).
3.5 Summary
Before moving on, let us take stock. Regarding the implications of the risk-taking
channel for optimal monetary policy in an otherwise standard New Keynesian model,
we have derived the following four analytical results:
• R1: Real interest rate volatility affects welfare negatively through the risk-
taking channel
• R2: The presence of the risk-taking channel lowers the optimal response to
inflation in a simple Taylor-type policy rule
• R3: Optimal monetary policy with the risk-taking channel calls for lower real
interest rate volatility and higher inflation volatility
• R4: The risk-taking channel introduces a motive for inertia in the policy rate
3.6 Extension: Optimal discretionary policy
The previous subsections assumed the central bank has commitment. We now con-
sider discretionary policy. That is, we assume that that the central bank cannot
credibly commit to any future action and thus cannot influence expectations about
future variables. Since there are no endogenous state variables, the central bank’s
problem then simplifies to a sequence of static optimization problems. Appendix
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B3.3 derives the first order conditions to the central bank’s problem as well as the
policy functions for the output gap, inflation, the nominal and real interest rates
and the associated forward-looking Taylor rule that implements such policy. Anal-
ogously to subsection 3.3, we are interested in the derivative of the Taylor rule
parameter and the rate of change of the standard deviations of the endogenous vari-
ables with respect to the risk-taking channel parameter R2. The results confirm
those derived for the simple rule: As before, the the risk-taking channel lowers the
optimal response of the nominal interest rate to expected inflation (R2) and implies
lower output gap and real interest rate volatility and higher inflation volatility under
optimal policy (R3).
3.7 Extension: Inefficient steady state
Previously we assumed that the steady state is undistorted. We will now relax this
assumption, and only assume that the steady state markup is small. That is, we
allow the steady state distortions from the risk taking channel to be arbitrary. In
that case the central bank’s problem is to maximize (16) subject to the Phillips
curve (15), the IS curve (18) and the Fisher equation (20).22
Results R1 to R3 go through. We cannot make conclusions about result R4 however,
since, with a distorted steady state, an instrument rule is not attainable in closed
form.
Result R1 is straightforward. For results R2 and R3, we focus on optimal simple
rules.23 In Appendix B3.4, e show that the derivative of the volatilities of inflation
and the real rate and the Taylor rule coefficient wrt. the terms in the objective
function related to the risk taking channel R1 and R2 have the same signs as before
under the (sufficient but not necessary) condition that the steady state effects of
the risk taking channel are not too large. To arrive to this conclusion we proceed
similar as before. However, since R1 (unlike R2) appears not only in the planner’s
objective function, but also in the constraints, we refine the procedure slightly. We
first compute the optimal Taylor rule, derive its coefficient wrt. the terms R1 and
R2 (R2), compute the equilibrium volatilities under that Taylor rule, and then de-
rive them wrt. the terms R1 and R2 that appear in the Taylor rule, keeping the
R1 term in the Phillips curve fixed (R3). The latter distinction was not necessary
before. That is, we now ask how volatilities change when the central banks takes
the risk-taking channel into account in in its optimal policy design. In other words,
we mute the effect of the risk-taking channel that comes from the change in the
behavior of the private sector given a certain policy, and focus purely on the effect
that comes from the change in the behavior of the policy maker. This is consistent
with the numerical exercise in the next section and has the following interpretation:
Suppose that the actual economy features the risk-taking channel, but the central
bank is unaware of this channel (or underestimates its true strength, i.e. R1 and R2)
and hence follows the policy that is optimal under those wrong believes. The deriva-
22The latter two are not affected by the steady state distortions.
23Results for the case of no commitment are similar and available upon request.
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tives of volatilities then tell us how the volatilities change, when the central bank’s
policy is adjusted towards the truly optimal policy, keeping the private economy’s
characteristics unchanged.
24Abbate and Thaler (2019) estimate the model on US data over 1984Q1 to 2007Q3, using seven
standard macro series, plus a measure of the equity ratio in the US banking sector, which allows
the identification of the banking sector parameters. More details can be found there.
25The risk-taking channel improves the posterior odds of the benchmark model by exp(3.1).
The variable qt displays a 60% correlation with the risk of newly issued loans, see figure 2 in the
Appendix. The correlation between the variables considered by Adrian and Shin (2014) (leverage
and the bank balance sheet size) is 43%. These are all non-targeted moments. See Abbate and
Thaler (2019) for further details.
4 The importance of the risk-taking channel in a quan-
titative New Keynesian model
In this section we ask whether the four analytical results summarized above are also
quantitatively important. After all, some previous studies have found other financial
frictions to have only quantitatively insignificant effects on optimal monetary policy
(e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 2001 or De Fiore and Tristani, 2013).
To quantify the importance of the risk-taking channel, we turn to the quantitative
model of Abbate and Thaler (2019). The latter embeds the same model of inter-
mediation and risk taking as above in an otherwise standard medium-scale New-
Keynesian model as in Smets and Wouters (2007). This model has three advantages
over the simple model of section 2: First, it includes a number of additional build-
ing blocks that bring it closer to macroeconomic dynamics. Second, it has been
estimated on US data.24 Thus, we can rely on a plausible set of empirically de-
termined parameters instead of making arbitrary parametric assumptions. Third,
Abbate and Thaler (2019) show that the inclusion of the risk-taking channel im-
proves the fit of the benchmark Smets-and-Wouters model with respect to standard
macro time series data, generates a path of risk taking that matches survey evidence
on the riskiness of newly issued loans, and gives rise to a procyclical bank leverage
as documented by Adrian and Shin (2014).25 This gives us confidence that this
model of the risk-taking channel is empirically plausible. In sum, the larger model
is useful to assess whether the new monetary policy trade-off between inflation and
real interest rate stabilization generated by the risk-taking channel is quantitatively
significant.
Since the larger model is essentially a medium scale extension of the simple model,
we rely on Abbate and Thaler (2019) for a full description, and limit ourselves to a
brief explanation of the differences. The larger model is different in five dimensions.
First, it includes capital. As common in the literature, we assume that banks finance
the capital stock and give up the assumption that wages need to be prefinanced. The
risky input good producer hence becomes a risky capital good producer. Inefficient
risk taking affects aggregate output through the productivity of capital, via the same
mechanisms discussed in the simple model. Second, the banking sector in the larger
model has two additional features that improve the model’s quantitative fit: Deposit
26
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26The deposit insurance scheme, which covers the gap between the insurance cap and the liqui-
dation value for the depositors of failing banks, is financed through a variable tax on capital.
27Deposit insurance does not affect the optimal frictionless level of risk. By contrast, the liqui-
dation value increases the optimal risk level, thereby easing the excessiveness of risk taking.
insurance and a non-zero liquidation value in case of bank default.26 These features
imply that, in case of bank failure, depositors get the maximum of the amount
covered by deposit insurance and the value of investment that can be recovered from
a failed project. Similar to the equity premium, deposit insurance improves the cost
advantage of deposits over equity, thereby worsening the risk-taking problem. The
liquidation value is irrelevant for the bank’s choice, because it is assumed to be
smaller than deposit insurance.27 Importantly, these additions leave Proposition 1
and thus the mechanism unchanged. Third, the larger model has additional features
that improve its quantitative fit: Habits in consumption, investment adjustment
costs, Kimball aggregation, monopolistic competition in the labor market, wage
stickiness, price and wage indexation. These features are standard in medium-scale
NK models. Fourth, the larger model includes a more complex shock structure.
While in the simple model we have considered only optimal responses to a cost-
push shock, the larger model features eight shocks. These are the seven shocks in
the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, plus a shock to the equity premium. Fifth,
we do not assume that the steady state is undistorted.
4.1 The numerical experiment
We proceed as follows. We set the model parameters to their posterior mean esti-
mates (cf. table 2 in Abbate and Thaler 2019). Then, we numerically determine the
optimal simple implementable monetary policy rule using a second order approxi-
mation as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). We focus on a simple policy rule
– as opposed to Ramsey optimal policy – both because such a rule is realistically
implementable and because their coefficients can easily be related to our analytical
results R2 and R4. We do so in two model versions: The full model with the risk-
taking channel (henceforth bank model), and a model version without this channel,
that corresponds to a standard Smets and Wouters economy (henceforth benchmark
model). We then compare the performance of these two optimal rules in the bank
model. This comparison has an interesting interpretation. Suppose that the actual
economy features the risk-taking channel (the bank model), but the central bank is
unaware of this channel and believes that risk taking cannot be influenced by the
interest rate. The central bank would then design optimal policy based on a wrong
model (the benchmark model). Our comparison then answers the question of how
important it is to understand the risk-taking channel, in terms of optimal policy
and welfare.
For this experiment we use the parameters estimated for the bank model for both the
bank and benchmark economy. I.e. we keep all parameters fixed for this comparison,
we just switch the banking sector on or off. The latter is done by fixing the equity
ratio and the risk choice at their steady state levels. Alternatively, we could assume
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28Implementability requires uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. Simplicity re-
quires the interest rate to be a function of readily observable variables. For a complete discussion,
see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
29One might wonder whether it would be useful for the central bank to respond to leverage as
an observable proxy for risk taking. However, since leverage and risk taking are dependent on the
nominal rate and inflation, both of which already appear in the Taylor rule, there is nothing to be
gained from doing so, at least up to first order.
that the central bank determines its policy based on an estimation of the benchmark
model. Our findings are robust to this alternative.
In particular, we look for the policy rule that maximizes welfare among the class of
simple, implementable interest-rate feedback rules given by:28
R̂t = φππ̂t+s + φyŷt+s + ρrR̂t−1 , (23)
where the index s allows for forward-looking or contemporaneous rules (respectively
by setting s = 1 or s = 0), and the hat symbol denotes log deviations from the steady
state (in case of s > 0 in expectations). We impose that the inertia parameter ρ
has to be non-negative. The policy rule (23) is a standard Taylor rule, which allows
for the two elements that we have found to be optimal in section 3 : A (weaker)
response to inflation and inertia.29
As before, the welfare criterion is the household’s conditional lifetime utility. To
compare welfare levels, we define the measure Ω as the fraction of the consumption
stream that a household would need to receive as a transfer under the suboptimal
rule S to be equally well off as under the optimal rule O. Ω is implicitly defined by
the following equation:
Table 1: Optimal simple rules: The second (third) column describes the timing (restrictions)
of the policy rule. Italics indicate restricted parameters.
rule benchmark model bank model
s restriction ρr φπt+s φyt+s ρ φπt+s φyt+s
I 0 ρr = 0 0 7.100 0.115 0 3.080 0.126
II 0 0.000 7.100 0.115 1.059 0.510 0.005
III 1 ρr = 0 0 17.222 0.148 0 4.294 0.172



















Our numerical analysis delivers four results, which mirror the four theoretical results
above.30 The first two results are evident from Table 1, which reports the optimal
coefficients for four different specifications of the monetary policy rule: contempo-
raneous and forward-looking, without inertia and with optimal inertia.
30The results are qualitatively robust with respect to the estimation sample and the choice of
the priors and calibrated parameters.
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31Values of ρr slightly above 1 are not uncommon e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
First, the optimal coefficient on inflation deviations is always significantly smaller
in the bank model than in the benchmark model. This confirms that our analytical
result R2 from the simple model – a lower optimal weight on inflation in the Taylor
rule – carries over to the medium scale model used here.
Second, if the central bank can optimize over its smoothing parameter, then full
interest rate smoothing is optimal in the bank model, but not in the benchmark
model (rows II and IV).31 This confirms result R4 that the risk-taking channel
introduces a rationale for interest rate smoothing.
But how do these differences in policy rules translate into differences in the behavior
of macroeconomic variables? Our third finding is the answer to this question and
is provided in Table 2. The table displays how much the mean and volatility of
key variables change when the central bank switches from the benchmark-optimal
rule to the bank-optimal rule in the bank model. By responding less aggressively
to inflation and by smoothing the nominal interest rate, the central bank optimally
limits the volatility of the real interest rate (column 4). The lower volatility of Rrt
translates into a higher average return on investment f(qt), due to the concavity of
this function in Rrt (column 10).32 However, this higher average return on investment
comes at the cost of higher inflation volatility (column 5), in line with the analytical
result R3. The increase in volatility is sizable (50-70%). Hence, the new trade-
off between inflation and real rate stabilization implies a significant deviation from
inflation stabilization: The central bank reacts a lot less strongly to deviations of
inflation from the target in order to achieve a more stable real rate
Table 2: Differences in moments associated with the optimal simple rules in the
benchmark and in the bank model: Columns 4-10 indicate the % change of mean and standard
deviations of key variables when the central bank switches from the benchmark-optimal to the bank-
optimal rule in the bank model. The first entry, for example, indicates that under the bank-optimal
policy rule the standard deviation of the real rate Rr is 48% lower than if the rule optimal for the
benchmark model had been applied in the bank model. The last column reports the welfare cost
(in % of the consumption stream) associated with implementing in the bank model the optimal
policy rule of the benchmark model.
rule standard deviation mean
s restriction Rr π y Rr π y f(q) Ω
I 0 ρr = 0 -47.975 52.470 -0.843 0.002 -0.051 0.311 0.045 0.476
II 0 -77.760 64.393 -9.545 0.007 -0.038 0.439 0.061 0.898
III 1 ρr = 0 -55.417 57.719 -2.781 0.011 -0.037 0.413 0.062 0.687
IV 1 -76.3112 71.906 -10.373 0.004 -0.054 0.458 0.057 0.813
Finally, we assess how different the equilibria associated to the two optimal rules
are in terms of welfare, and therefore how important it is for the central bank
to take the risk-taking channel into account. To do so, we compute the welfare
cost Ω of applying the rule that is optimal for the benchmark model in the bank
32Note that the slight increase in Rrt accounts only for a marginal fraction of the increase in
f(qt).
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model (in the long run, ignoring the transition). These costs, expressed in % of
the lifetime consumption stream, are reported in the last column of Table 2. They
are significant for all policy rule specifications. For the best-performing policy, the
cost of applying the benchmark policy in the bank model are around 0.81% of the
lifetime consumption stream. The effect of the risk-taking channel on the policy
maker’s objective function that we approximated analytically above (result R1)
turns out to be economically significant.
In sum, the risk-taking channel is economically significant for optimal monetary
33For an analysis of macroprudential regulation in an economy with bank risk-taking see for
example Collard et al. (2017).
5 Conclusions
This paper analyses the implications of the risk-taking channel for optimal monetary
policy. To this end we first embed a model of asset risk taking into the textbook
NKM. Then, we characterize optimal policy analytically using a linear quadratic
approximation. We find that the risk-taking channel (i) introduces real rate volatility
into the otherwise standard objective function of the central bank, (ii) calls for lower
real rate volatility and higher inflation volatility, (iii) lowers the optimal response
to inflation in a Taylor-type policy rule, (iv) introduces a motive for inertia in the
policy rule. Lastly, we extend the model to a medium-scale DSGE model of the
type routinely used at central banks to evaluate the quantitative importance of the
risk-taking channel for monetary policy. We show that the four conclusions from the
simple model not only carry over, but also matter significantly. Conducting optimal
policy as if the risk-taking channel were not present entails high costs in terms of
welfare.
Our model of the risk-taking channel is analytically tractable and our analysis de-
livers clear results for optimal monetary policy. To this end, we have abstracted
form other dimensions of the risk-taking channel such as risks on the liabilities side
of banks, effects of the zero lower bound or long spells of low interest rates. At the
same time however, our qualitative lessons about optimal policy can be of relevance
for any theory that relates TFP to the level of the real interest rate, such as some
theories of capital misallocation (e.g. Gopinath et al., 2017).
Furthermore, our model economy features no regulatory tools. While these tools are
important, they are outside the scope of the present paper.33 Instead we focus on
what the monetary policy maker can do about risk taking in the (realistic) case that
the risk-taking channel cannot be fully addressed by regulation. Using monetary
policy to address shortcomings of “imperfect” regulation is advocated in a similar
context e.g. by Stein (2013) and Bean et al. (2015), and was discussed as an option
during the January 2020 FOMC meeting.
policy both in terms of the prescribed policy and the welfare cost of deviating from
it.
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Online Appendix
Appendix A: Full set of recursive equations in the simple
model
The following 12 equations (24) - (35) define the equilibrium. Note that only equa-
tions (24) - (26) differ from the standard NKM and that the model collapses to the

























































Z1,t = Λtmctyt + βλpEt [(πt+1)εp Z1,t+1] (32)





1 = (1 − λ) (πt )1−εp + λ (πt)εp−1 (34)
Δt = (1 − λ) (πt )−εp + λΔt−1 (πt)εp (35)
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The following equations are recursive:
dt + et = mt−1/πt + wtNt − Ct + xt (36)
mt = mt−1/πt + wtNt − dt − et − Ct + Rt (dt + et) + Πt + xt + ξet − Tt (37)











dt + et = ot (41)




Appendix B: Deriving optimal policy
B1: Deriving the welfare function
Our goal is to derive a second-order approximation to the utility of the household
when the economy is close to the steady state, around a zero-inflation steady state
and in the case of a small steady state distortion. We follow Galí (2015) and Ravenna
and Walsh (2006). The procedure involves 8 steps. We preliminary describe the
notation that will be used throughout the derivations:
Table 3: Notation
Xt variable in level
X steady state level
xt variable in log: ln(Xt)
x̂t log deviation from steady state: xt − x = ln(Xt) − ln(X) = ln(Xt/X)
X̂t absolute deviation from steady state
Rrt gross real interest rate
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2137
Step 1: Take a second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function in
time t around the steady state C,N:





where t.i.p. stands for terms independent of policy, U = U(C, N) denotes the
utility function evaluated at the steady state and Ux = Ux(C, N),Uxx = Uxx(C, N)
respectively denote the first and second order derivative of the utility function with
respect to variable x, evaluated at the steady state. Multiply and divide by steady-
state consumption or employment, where appropriate:


















Step 2 Exploit the aggregate resource constraint: Yt = Ct
Note that, given our utility function, UCCUC C = −σ and
UNN
UN
N = ϕ. Use that
Xt−X
X  x̂t+ 12 x̂2t and drop terms of order higher than 2, i.e. use that
(





x̂2t + x̂3t + 14 x̂
4
t  x̂2t :








































Step 3: Express aggregate employment as a function of output. From our




where Δt expresses the resource loss due to the price dispersion term, and where
f (Rrt ) is the dispersion term related to the risk-taking channel, which depends on
the expected real interest rate Rrt . We take logs of both sides:
ln(Nt) = ln(Δt) + ln(Yt) − ln(At) − ln f(Rrt )
We derive the second-order Taylor expansion of ln f(Rrt ):
ln f(Rrt ) ≈ ln f(Rr) +
fR
f(Rr)






U(Ct, Nt)  U+UC
[
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2(3 (Rr)2 ξ2 + 12Rrξ3 + 11ξ4)
(Rr + ξ)2(Rr + 2ξ)2(Rr + 3ξ)2
> 0
Replace the second-order Taylor expansion of ln f(Rrt ) into the expression for ag-
gregate employment, and subtract from both sides the log of the steady state. Since
ln(Δ) = ln(1) = δ = 0 and ln(A) = ln(1) = a = 0 we have:






We can plug this into our utility function:


























Now, we use the following Lemma, proven in ch. 3.4 of Galí (2015): δt = θ2var {pt(i)}.
This is valid in the neighborhood of a symmetric steady state and up to a second
order approximation. Using this Lemma, and the fact that terms of order higher
than 2 can be dropped out of the approximation, yields:





















ŷt − at − R1R̂rt
)2)
+t.i.p.
Step 4: Divide everything by UcC so to express the approximation as a
percentage of steady state consumption:
U(Ct, Nt) − U
UCY



















ŷt − at − R1R̂rt
)2)
+t.i.p.
Combining the household first order condition with respect to labor, and input








Aq (ω1 − ω2q)
Φ
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34In the absence of the subsidy on input goods, there would be an additional term related to
the cost channel in the above equation, but the rest of the derivations would be unaffected.

















Define Θ such that:
1 − Θ = 1
Φ
We can exploit the definition of Θ as well as the assumption of a small steady
state distortion (so any interaction with terms of order ≥ 2 can be eliminated) to
re-express the utility approximation as:
U(Ct, Nt) − U
UCY











− 1 + ϕ
2
(




ŷt − at − R1R̂rt
)
+ t.i.p.
Note also that at is independent of policy and hence can go into the t.i.p. After
some rearranging of terms, we get:
U(Ct, Nt) − U
UCY









θvar {pt(i)} − (1 − σ) ŷ2t + (1 + ϕ)
(
ŷt − at − R1R̂rt
)2]
+ t.i.p.
Step 5: Collect terms related to output deviations and re-express them as
output gap deviations. Open the square bracket
(
ŷt − at − R1R̂rt
)2
and collect
terms related to output deviations squared:
U(Ct, Nt) − U
UCY














)2 − 2 (1 + ϕ) ŷtR1R̂rt + 2 (1 + ϕ) atR1R̂rt ]+ t.i.p.
Re-express productivity as a function of the efficient level of output yet where needed.





Denoting the output gap as xt = yt − yet we can express the utility approximation
as:
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U(Ct, Nt) − U
UCY

















)2 − 2ŷtR1R̂rt + 2atR1R̂rt)+ t.i.p.
Step 6: Express var {pt(i)} as a function of inflation. From Woodford (2000)




t , where ω is the Calvo parameter. So we have that:
∞∑
t=0































)2 − 2ŷtR1R̂rt + 2atR1R̂rt)]
]}



























)2 − 2ŷtR1R̂t + 2atR1R̂rt)
]}
Collect the terms related to the real interest rate, remember that at is independent

















(1 + ϕ)R21 + R2
) (
R̂rt
)2 −R1 (σ − 1) R̂rt ŷet + R1 (1 + ϕ) R̂rt x̂t
]}
The first three terms in this approximation are standard. Welfare loss increases
with distortions in the current output gap (from the first best level), and with the
volatility of inflation and in the output gap. The remaining terms derive from the
inclusion of the risk-taking channel:
• − (1 − Θ)R1R̂rt : A higher real interest rate, decreases the inefficiency of risk
taking, reducing the welfare loss.
•
(




: The real rate affects the efficiency of the banks’
investment choice and through that the productivity of labor (TFP). Volatility
in the real interest rate makes TFP more volatile and reduces it on average
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(due to the concavity of f). These two effects, which are captured by the two
coefficients, imply that real rate volatility lowers welfare.
• R1 (σ − 1) R̂rt ŷet : For a risk aversion parameter σ greater than unity, this term
is clearly positive, implying that welfare losses increase in the covariance be-
tween the real interest rate gap and the efficient level of output (i.e. produc-
tivity). A negative productivity shock (a fall in the efficient level of output)
coupled with a fall in the real interest rate would imply an even larger negative
productivity shock, amplifying the welfare loss. This is because a lower real
rate increases the inefficiency of risk-taking, lowering the marginal productiv-
ity of labor.
• −R1R̂rt (1 + ϕ) x̂t: Welfare losses decrease in the covariance between the out-
put gap the real interest rate gap. The intuition is the same as for the previous
covariance term: A positive output gap coupled with an increase in the real
interest rate implies an additional increase in the output gap, increasing wel-
fare. This is because a higher real rate decreases the inefficiency of risk-taking,
increasing the marginal productivity of labor and through that aggregate out-
put.
Step 8: Assume correction of the steady state distortion through fiscal
instruments. If we assume that the steady state is undistorted then Θ = 0 and
R1 = 0 and x̂t = xt. The second equality follows from the first derivative of f(Rr)
being equal to zero, given the optimal steady state risk choice. The approximated





















Hence, only the variance of the real interest rate remains as an additional term in
the welfare loss function.
B2: The linearized Phillips curve
We can express the Phillips curve as (Galí (2015), ch.3):
πt = βEt [πt+1] − κφ̃t (45)
with φ̃t being the deviation between the average and the desired markup and κ =
(1−ω)(1−βω)
ω . Note that the average price markup is equal to the inverse of real
marginal costs, defined in equation (24):
φt = pt − (wt − at − ln f(Rrt ))
where small-case letters denote logs. We can then substitute the household’s labor
choice (ϕnt + σct = wt − pt) and use yt = ct, yielding:
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φt = − (ϕnt + σyt) + at + ln f(Rrt )
Substitute for nt using nt = yt − at − ln f(Rrt )
φt = − (σ + ϕ) yt + (1 + ϕ) at + (1 + ϕ) ln f(Rrt )
Under flexible prices, the markup is equal to the desired level (Φnt = θt/ (θt − 1)):
φnt = − (σ + ϕ) ynt + (1 + ϕ) at + (1 + ϕ) ln f(Rr,nt ) (46)
Get an expression for φ̃t, the deviation between the average and the desired markup:
φ̃t = − (σ + ϕ) (yt − ynt ) + (1 + ϕ) (ln f(Rrt ) − ln f(Rr,nt ))
Use the identity yt − ynt = (yt − yet ) + (yet − ynt ) :
φ̃t = − (σ + ϕ) (yt − yet ) − (σ + ϕ) (yet − ynt ) + (1 + ϕ) (ln f(Rrt ) − ln f(Rr,nt ))
Use the definition of the welfare relevant output gap:
φ̃t = − (σ + ϕ)xt − (σ + ϕ) (yet − ynt ) + (1 + ϕ) (ln f(Rrt ) − ln f(Rr,nt ))
Subtract the steady state, and denote with “hat” deviations from the steady state.
φ̃t − 0 = − (σ + ϕ) x̂t − (σ + ϕ) (ŷet − ŷnt )
+ (1 + ϕ) [ln f(Rrt ) − ln f(Rr) − ln f(Rr,nt ) + ln f(Rr,n)]
A first order Taylor expansion of the bracket in the second line yields R1R̂rt −R1R̂r,nt
(see Appendix B1 step 3) so we can write
φ̃t = − (σ + ϕ) x̂t + (1 + ϕ)R1R̂rt − (1 + ϕ)R1R̂r,nt − (σ + ϕ) (ŷet − ŷnt )
Using the definitions of ŷet and ŷnt (44) and (46) we can rewrite this as:
φ̃t = − (σ + ϕ) x̂t + (1 + ϕ)R1R̂rt − φ̂t
Substitute the above equation into the first version of the Phillips curve (45):
πt = βEt [πt+1] + κ (σ + ϕ) x̂t − κ (1 + ϕ)R1R̂rt + ut
Where we have defined the cost-push shock as ut = κφ̂t, i.e. the term capturing
short-run deviations of the desired markup caused by movements in the parameter
θt.
Under the assumption of an efficient steady state the expression simplifies to the
standard Phillips curve, since R1 = 0.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 42 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2137
πt = βEt [πt+1] + κ (σ + ϕ)xt + ut
B3: Optimal monetary policy




















πt = βEtπt+1 + κ (σ + ϕ)xt + ut ∀t (49)
R̂rt = R̂t − Etπt+1 ∀t (50)
where κ = (1−ω)(1−βω)ω is the coefficient on marginal costs in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, λ = κθ (σ + ϕ) denotes the weight of output gap fluctuations relative
to inflation fluctuations in the loss function, θ is the elasticity of substitution between
goods, and where we have already substituted R̂rt = R̂t − Etπ̂t+1. The term ut is a
cost-push shock that follows an AR process with autoregessive coefficient ρ.
B3.1: Optimal simple rule
To determine the Taylor-type optimal simple rule, follow Clarida et al. (1999), we
first find an optimal simple rule that depends on the only the exogenous state,
analyze the associated equilibrium and then solve for the equivalent Taylor-type
rule. We present the results in the main text in the reverse order.
Consider a rule for the target output gap, contingent on the fundamental shock ut
xt = −γut, ∀t (51)
This particular rule is motivated by the fact that the optimal policy under discretion
leads to a rule of such shape. Furthermore it is analytically convenient.
Combine this equation with the Phillips curve (49) and the IS curve (48), and get
expressions for πt and R̂rt that also depend on the fundamental shock:
πt = βEtπt+1 − κ (σ + ϕ) γut + ut
R̂rt = γσ (1 − ρ)ut + Etπt+1 (52)
Manipulate the Phillips curve to get:
πt = βEtπt+1 + [1 − κ (σ + ϕ) γ]ut





βiρi [1 − κ (σ + ϕ) γ]ut
}
πt =
1 − κ (σ + ϕ) γ
1 − βρ ut (53)
Using this we can rewrite the is curve
R̂rt = γσ (1 − ρ)ut +
1 − κ (σ + ϕ) γ
1 − βρ ρut (54)






subject to the contemporaneous Phillips and IS curve (53) and (54) and
the policy rule (51). Plugging in, the optimal policy problem can be re-expressed
as choosing the value of γ that maximizes the following objective function:
(1 − κ (σ + ϕ) γ
1 − βρ
)2
u2t + λγ2u2t +
κ
θ
R2 (γσ (1 − ρ))2 u2t










This solution can be substituted in equations (51), (54) and (53) to get the policy
functions for the output gap, inflation and the nominal and real interest rate.
xt = aut = −γut (56)





1 − βρ ut (57)
Rt = cut = −
(
θ(λρ(1 − βρ) − κ(1 − ρ)σ(σ + ϕ)) − κ(1 − ρ)2ρR2σ2(1 − βρ)
)
θ (λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2(σ + ϕ)2) + κ(1 − ρ)2R2σ2(1 − βρ)2 ut (58)
Rrt = dut =
θκ(1 − ρ)σ(σ + ϕ)
θ (λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2(σ + ϕ)2) + κ(1 − ρ)2R2σ2(1 − βρ)2 ut (59)
The parameters multiplying the shock also determine the standard deviation of
the variables of interest up to a constant, which is the standard deviation of the
exogenous shock). We can compute the rate of change of these standard deviations
with respect to the risk-taking channel parameter R2 to understand how the risk






(1−βρ)2 + λ +
κ(1−ρ)2R2σ2
θ
) < 0 (60)
σπ,R2 =
θκ3(1 − ρ)2σ2(σ + ϕ)2
(θλ + κ(1 − ρ)2R2σ2) (θ (λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2(σ + ϕ)2) + κ(1 − ρ)2R2σ2(1 − βρ)2) > 0 (61)
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σR,R2 = −








(θ(λρ(1 − βρ) + κ(1 − ρ)σ(σ + ϕ)) + κ(1 − ρ)2ρR2σ2(1 − βρ)) (θ (λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2(σ + ϕ)2) + κ(1 − ρ)2R2σ2(1 − βρ)2)
(62)
σRr,R2 = −
κ(1 − ρ)2σ2(1 − βρ)2
θ (λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2(σ + ϕ)2) + κ(1 − ρ)2R2σ2(1 − βρ)2 < 0 (63)
σx,R2 and σRr,R2 are evidently negative while σπ,R2 is evidently positive, as in the
case without commitment. The sign of σR,R2 is ambiguous as before. However, for
low enough values of ρ the derivative of the standard deviation with respect to the
risk-taking channel parameter is negative. We can see this by setting ρ to zero,
which yields ∂σr/∂R2σr = − κσ
2
θ(κ2(σ+ϕ)2+λ)+κR2σ2 < 0. Overall, we can conclude that
the inclusion of the risk-taking channel implies a lower output gap and real interest
rate volatility and a higher inflation volatility under optimal policy.
Asin Clarida et al. (1999), we can reexpress the policy rule for the nominal interest
rate as a function of expected future inflation. The parameter multiplying expected
inflation is the optimal Taylor rule parameter φcπ, describing how the central bank
should react to expected inflation:
R̂t = φsπEtπt+1 =
[
1 +
θκσ(1 − ρ)(σ + ϕ)
ρ(1 − βρ) (θλ + κ(1 − ρ)2R2σ2)
]
Etπt+1 (64)
We can see that the presence of the risk-taking channel lowers the optimal response
of the nominal interest rate to expected inflation, i.e.:
∂φsπ
∂R2 = −
θκ(ρ − 1)3σ3(σ(κ + ρ − 1) + κϕ)
(ρ(β + κ) − 1) (θλ + κ(ρ − 1)2R2σ2)2
− θκ
2(1 − ρ)3σ3(σ + ϕ)
ρ(1 − βρ) (θλ + κ(1 − ρ)2σ2)2 < 0
(65)
B3.2: Ramsey-optimal policy
Under full commitment, the central bank’s problem is to maximizes (47) , by choos-
ing conditional paths for inflation, the output gap and the interest rate. The asso-




















+ ψt [πt − βπt+1 − κ (σ + ϕ)xt − ut]
+ ςt
(
−R̂rt + R̂t − πt+1
)}
(66)
The multipliers associated to the Phillips curve, the IS curve and the definition of
the real rate are respectively ψt, χt and ςt. The FOCs wrt. πt, xt, R̂t, R̂rt , ςtt are:
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χt + ςt = 0
κ
θ
R2R̂rt − ςt = 0






πt − βπt+1 − κ (σ + ϕ)xt − ut = 0
−R̂rt + R̂t − πt+1 = 0
with χ−1 = ψ−1 = 0. We can eliminate R̂rt and ςtt to simplify the system somewhat




























πt − βπt+1 − κ (σ + ϕ)xt − ut = 0
Unfortunately, no simple analytical solution is available for the rational expectations
equilibrium defined by these conditions.
However, is possible to combine the first three equations to derive the following
implicit instrument rule as in Giannoni and Woodford (2003). This rule applies
from t ≥ 2 and is optimal from a timeless perspective:



















As in Giannoni and Woodford (2003), this Taylor-type rule exhibits a nontrivial
degree of persistence: ρ1 = 1, ρ2 	 0. By construction, the optimal Taylor rule
under no commitment or under optimal simple rules does not feature any persistence.
As Woodford (2001) shows, in the standard NKM – i.e. in this model without the
risk-taking channel – the fully optimal interest rate paths do not involve any explicit
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35Note that the above rule does not nest a rule for the standard NKM. However, as the weight
on real rate stabilization κ
θ
R22 goes towards 0, past interest rates become less important in the
determination of current interest rate, relative to deviations of output and inflation.
reference to the path of interest rates either.35 Thus, under fully optimal policy the
risk-taking channel requires persistent policy responses. This is a result of the fact
that the interest rate appears in the welfare function.
The risk-taking channel thus provides an additional explanation for interest rate
inertia, which is routinely built into Taylor rules in models, and which is typically
observed in practice. It augments other theories such as the zero lower bound or the
cost of holding money, which regularly motivate researchers to include the interest
rate – the nominal one, not the real one as in our case – in the welfare function and
which also lead to inertia under optimal policy.
B3.3: Optimal discretionary policy
We start with the simpler case, assuming that the central bank cannot credibly
commit itself to any future action and cannot therefore influence expectations on
future variables. The central bank problem simplifies to one of sequential optimi-
sation, i.e. the central bank chooses output and inflation in order to minimise the




subject to the contemporaneous
IS and Phillips curve, whose multupliers are denoted by χt and ψt . Under optimal
discretion, the first order conditions for the central bank problem are:
∂Ut
∂πt
= −πt + ψt = 0
∂Ut
∂xt













The above conditions imply the following equilibrium relationship between inflation,
the output gap and the real interest rate, under optimal discretionary monetary
policy:
πt = − λ
κ (σ + ϕ)
xt +
σ κθ R2





Next, we derive the policy functions for the key variables of interest. We find
them using the method of undetermined coefficients. Since there are no endogenous
states, the policy functions must be linear functions in the cost-push shock ut. We
assume therefore the following policy functions: xt = aut, πt = but R̂t = cut and
R̂rt = dut. Since the cost-push shock is AR(1), we also know that Ext+1 = aρut and
Eπt+1 = bρut. Combining these functions with the Phillips curve (49), the IS curve
(48), the definition of the real rate and the central bank’s optimality condition (67),
we can derive the following coefficients:
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a = − θκ(σ + ϕ)
θ (−βλρ + κ2(σ + ϕ)2 + λ) + κ(ρ − 1)R2σ2(βρ − 1) (68)
b =
θλ − κ(ρ − 1)R2σ2
θ (−βλρ + κ2(σ + ϕ)2 + λ) + κ(ρ − 1)R2σ2(βρ − 1) (69)
c =
θ(λρ − κ(ρ − 1)σ(σ + ϕ)) − κ(ρ − 1)ρR2σ2
θ (−βλρ + κ2(σ + ϕ)2 + λ) + κ(ρ − 1)R2σ2(βρ − 1) (70)
d = − θκ(ρ − 1)σ(σ + ϕ)
θ (−βλρ + κ2(σ + ϕ)2 + λ) + κ(ρ − 1)R2σ2(βρ − 1) (71)
The absolute values of these coefficients also determine the standard deviation of
the output gap, inflation and the nominal and real interest rates, up to a scaling
factor which is the standard deviation of the cost-push shock. We are interested
in establishing how these standard deviations change with the risk-taking channel.
To do so, we derive the rate of change of the four coefficients with respect to the
risk-taking channel parameter R2 – e.g. σx,R2 = ∂a∂R2 a−1 – and check the sign:
σx,R2 = −
κ(1 − ρ)σ2(1 − βρ)
θ (λ(1 − βρ) + κ2(σ + ϕ)2) + κ(1 − ρ)R2σ2(1 − βρ) < 0 (72)
σπ,R2 =
θκ3(1 − ρ)σ2(σ + ϕ)2
(θλ + κ(1 − ρ)R2σ2) (θ (λ(1 − βρ) + κ2(σ + ϕ)2) + κ(1 − ρ)R2σ2(1 − βρ)) > 0 (73)
σR,R2 =
θκ2(1 − ρ)σ2(σ + ϕ)(σ(ρ(β(1 − ρ) + κ + 1) − 1) + κρϕ)
(θ(λρ + κ(1 − ρ)σ(σ + ϕ)) + κ(1 − ρ)ρR2σ2) (θ (λ(1 − βρ) + κ2(σ + ϕ)2) + κ(1 − ρ)R2σ2(1 − βρ))
(74)
σRr,R2 = −
κ(1 − ρ)σ2(1 − βρ)
θ (λ(1 − βρ) + κ2(σ + ϕ)2) + κ(1 − ρ)R2σ2(1 − βρ) < 0 (75)
Given that ρ < 1 and β < 1, it is straightforward to see that all terms in the
numerators and denominators of (72), (73) and (75) are positive. Thus σx,R2and
σRr,R2 are negative, implying that the standard deviation of the output gap under
optimal policy is lower when the risk-taking channel is present. By contrast, σπ,R2
is negative, indicating that the standard deviation of inflation increases with the
risk-taking channel.
The sign of σR,R2 in equation (74) is ambiguous. While the denominator is clearly
positive, the sign of the numerator depends on the value of the autoregressive pa-
rameter ρ. For low enough values of this parameter, the derivative of the standard
deviation with respect to the risk-taking channel parameter is negative. We can see
this, by considering the case of an i.i.d. shock (ρ=0). In this case, equations (72) to
(75) become:


















BANCO DE ESPAÑA 48 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2137
To derive a policy rule that implements the above equilibrium, we re-express the
nominal interest rate as a function of expected future inflation (see Clarida et al.
(1999)). The parameter multiplying expected inflation can be interpreted as an
optimal Taylor rule parameter φdπ, describing how the central bank should react to
expected inflation under optimal discretionary policy:
R̂t = φdπEtπt+1t =
θ(λρ + κ(1 − ρ)(σ + ϕ)ϕ) + κ(1 − ρ)ρR2σ2
ρθλ + κ(1 − ρ)ρR2σ2
Etπt+1 (76)
We can see that the presence of the risk-taking channel lowers the optimal response
of the nominal interest rate to inflation, i.e.:
∂φdπ
∂R2 = −
θκ2(1 − ρ)2σ3(σ + ϕ)
ρ (θλ + κ(1 − ρ)R2σ2)2
< 0 (77)
Note that it suffices to take a derivative since the sign of equation (76) is clearly
negative.
B3.4 Optimal simple rules with a distorted steady state























(1 − Θ)R1R̂rt − R1
κ
θ











πt = βEtπt+1 + κ (σ + ϕ) x̂t − κ (1 + ϕ)R1R̂rt + ut (80)
R̂rt = R̂t − Etπt+1 ∀t (81)
Note that we have dropped ŷet since in the absence of productivity shocks the efficient
level of output is constant.
Proceeding similarly as in appendix B3.1, we can derive an optimal simple rule in
the form of a (forward looking) Taylor rule. Note that as before we restrict ourselves
to one- instrument rules with zero steady state inflation. Not allowing steady state
inflation is without loss of generality. To see this recall that zero steady state
inflation is optimal in the three equations New Keynesian model (see Gali 2008).
Since the real rate is exogenous to policy, it must also be optimal in the model with
the risk-taking channel.
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R̂t = φdssπ Etπt+1 (82)
φdssπ = 1+
θκ(1 − ρ)σ [σ ((1 − ρ)R1(ϕ + 1) + 1) + ϕ]
κ(1 − ρ)σρ(1 − βρ)
(
(1 − ρ)(R1)2σ(ϕ + 1) + 2R1(ϕ + 1) + (1 − ρ)R2σ
)
+ ρ(1 − βρ)θλ
The derivative of the coefficient φdssπ wrt. R1 and R2 is given by
∂φdssπ
∂R1 = −
















(R1)2 (ϕ + 1) + R2
)




θκ2(1 − ρ)3σ3(σ((1 − ρ)R1(ϕ + 1) + 1) + ϕ)
ρ(1 − βρ)
(
θλ + κ(1 − ρ)σ
(
(1 − ρ) (R1)2 σ(ϕ + 1) + 2R11(ϕ + 1) + (1 − ρ)R2σ
))2 < 0











in the numerator is positive. Assuming that R2 → 0 this is indeed the case.
That is an increase in the severity of the second order effect of the risk-taking
channel R2 unambiguously reduces the Taylor rule coefficient, just as before in
appendix B3.1. An increase in the first order effect of the risk-taking channel R1
staring at R1 = R2 = 0 reduces the Taylor rule coefficient as well. Hence, for a weak
enough risk taking channel, an increase in the strength of the risk taking channel
(an increase of R1, R2) reduces the coefficient φdssπ .
Next, we solve the system






πt = βEtπt+1 + κ (σ + ϕ) x̂t − κ (1 + ϕ)R1R̂rt + ut (84)
R̂rt = R̂t − Etπt+1 ∀t (85)
R̂t = φdssπ (R̄1, R̄2)Etπt+1 (86)
using the method of undetermined coefficients. We get xt = aut, πt = but R̂t = cut















θλ + κ(1 − ρ)σ
(
(1 − ρ)(R̄1)2σ(ϕ + 1) + 2R̄1(ϕ + 1) + (1 − ρ)R̄2σ))
e
(88)










κ(ρ − 1)ρσ(βρ − 1)
(
(ρ − 1) (R̄1)2 σ(ϕ + 1) − 2R̄1(ϕ + 1) + (ρ − 1)R̄2σ)
e
d = a (90)
where
e = κ(1 − ρ)σ(1 − βρ)2
(
(1 − ρ) (R̄1)2 σ(ϕ + 1) + (1 − ρ)R̄2σ + 2R̄1(ϕ + 1))
+θ
{
λ(1 − βρ)2 + κ2 [σ ((1 − ρ)R̄1(ϕ + 1) + 1)+ ϕ] [σ ((1 − ρ)R1(ϕ + 1) + 1) + ϕ]} > 0
Note that we have distinguished between (i) R1 in the Phillips curve (84), and (ii)
R1 and R2 in the central banks policy function (86), which we relabeled R̄1 and R̄2.
This allows us to distinguish the effect that the risk taking channel has (i) through
the change in the dynamics of the private sector of the economy and (ii) through
the change in the optimal behavior of the central bank. If the central bank is fully
aware of the risk taking channel naturally R̄x = Rx for x = 1, 2. If the central
bank behaves as if the channel didn’t exist then R̄x = 0. Deriving the equilibrium
wrt. R̄1 and R̄2 then tell us how the equilibrium in the risk-taking-channel economy
characterized by (83)-(85) changes when the central bank adjusts its policy rule from
a rule that the central banks finds optimal when it underestimates the strength of
the risk-taking channel towards the rule that is optimal given the actual strength of
the risk-taking channel.36
Recall from section B3.1 that the coefficients a to d determine the standard devia-
tions of the respective variables. Analogously to what we did in sections B3.1 and
B3.3, we can compute the rate of change of these standard deviations with respect
to the policy related risk-taking channel parameters R̄1 and R̄2. As in section B3.1
σx,R̄2 and σRr,R̄2 are negative while σπ,R̄2 is positive.
σx,R̄2 = σRr,R̄2 = −




θκ3(1 − ρ)2σ2(σ((1 − ρ)R̄1(ϕ + 1) + 1) + ϕ)(σ((1 − ρ)R1(ϕ + 1) + 1) + ϕ)(










As for the Taylor rule, rate of change of the standard deviations wrt. R̄1 is ambigu-
ous – in both cases the denominator is negative and the numerator is positive if the
aforementioned term is positive.
σx,R̄1 = σRr,R̄1 = −





















36The results go through if we do not make the distinction between R1 and R̄1.
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σπ,R̄1 =





















(ϕ + 1) + R̄2
)









R̄21(ϕ + 1) + R̄2
)




σ((1 − ρ)R̄1(ϕ + 1) + 1) + ϕ
)
(σ((1 − ρ)R1(ϕ + 1) + 1) + ϕ) > 0
But it becomes unambiguous when R2 → 0 . Then σx,R̄1 and σRr,R̄1 are negative
while σπ,R̄1 is positive.
To conclude: The introduction or strengthening of the risk taking channel means an
increase in the positive parametersR1 and R2. An increase of these two parameters
implies a reduction of the Taylor rule coefficient, the volatility of the real rate and
the output gap and an increase in the volatility of inflation, if the risk-taking channel
is weak enough. The latter is a sufficient but not necessary condition.
Appendix C: Additional figures
Figure 2: Risk taking in the model and in the data: The figure compares the value of loan
safety qt implied by the estimated model (in particular we plot the mean of the series posterior
distribution) with a survey-based index of loan safety computed from the US Terms of Business
Lending Survey. The figure is borrowed from Abbate and Thaler (2019). See this paper for more
details on the estimation procedure and the empirical risk measure.







q model (left scale)
loan risk survey (right scale)
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